DUTCH RELIEF ALLIANCE

Somalia Joint Response
CRISIS MODIFIER LEARNING PAPER

Hygiene Kits Distribution. Photo: Havoyoco

Somalia Joint Response (SOMJR) partners

OXFAM · Red een KIND · MEDAIR · SOS CHILDREN'S VILLAGES SOMALILAND · World Vision

CANDLELIGHT For Environment Education & Health · HAVOYOCO Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee · KAALO Aid and Development Org. · ZAMZAM Foundation · Munadhamat Al-Dawa Al-Islamiya · TAAKULO SOMALILAND COMMUNITY TASCO

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1. METHODOLOGY

The overall conclusions in this learning paper utilize primary and secondary research, including Key Informant Interviews with the SOMJR Coordinator, as well as INGO and LNGO partners that made use of the SOMJR Crisis Modifier mechanism. A review of peer-reviewed and policy literature identified the types of disaster risk financing instruments with potential relevance to the Crisis Modifier's context and localization components. The review included existing literature from participating organizations (provided by Oxfam) and partners, search terms for keywords related to the crisis modifier, crisis types in Somalia, and humanitarian intervention.

The crisis modifier was a pilot and activated for two crisis types: COVID-19 and climate shocks. The paper does not investigate specifics of activities on the ground and their life-saving potential or its output indicators for early action to mitigate effects of sudden shocks from crisis. Instead it focuses on qualitative in-depth interviews with individuals that have a great understanding of the community served by the crisis modifier. The purpose of the KII was to collect information from a wide range of informants in nine different organizations situated in various regions of Somalia, who have first-hand knowledge about how their intervention addressed the objectives set out in the SOMJR crisis modifier, its foundations on Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) and complimentary with SOMJR's contributions to localization.

1.1. Approach

As per the prepared ToRs, the paper is informed by an initial desktop review of SOMJR 'Crisis Modifier' to gain more in-depth understanding of the crisis modifier's programmatic and administrative structure. This was achieved through close assessment of each local partner's project narrative and budget, which were submitted to the SOMJR Coordination unit between January 2020 and November 2020. Additionally, narrative reports were reviewed to identify the outcomes and sequence of actions in these pilot projects, and to compare against the crisis modifier's CHS and Localization criteria. This allowed us to formulate study questions with inference to specific concerns of the study into three sections, informed by the following objectives: (1) To understand the nature of the crisis modifier within the context of each organization's ongoing programming, SOMJR or otherwise; (2) To understand the extent to which the crisis modifier contributes to relevant, effective, accountable, and efficient support for the SOMJR target communities; and (3) To understand if and how the crisis modifier contributes to localization.

1.2. Limitations

At the time of this study, due to global COV-19 restrictions and the need for its timely conclusion, the study was conducted remotely, which has placed several limitations on scope, insight and the methodological tools harnessed by the study. The pilot nature of the crisis modifier also means limited scope for comparative assessment on efficacy and impact of funded activities. Furthermore, only two of the six partners had submitted their final narrative reports.

2. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1. Key Findings

The SOMJR crisis modifier design enables and contributes to the localization of aid. The flexible nature of the crisis modifier mechanism in SOMJR empowered local partners to identify humanitarian needs as they arose, design interventions in collaboration with affected communities, and adjust humanitarian interventions to changing conditions. Local partners did so independently of their international partners, with some limitations.

The SOMJR crisis modifier mechanism supported effective, efficient, timely, rapid and flexible humanitarian interventions. Local partners consistently reported being the first or among the first humanitarian actors to respond to COVID-19, and several local partners made dynamic use of crisis modifier funding to adapt responses to new crises and changing community priorities.

Best practices from SOMJR crisis modifier design. Allocating crisis modifier funds directly to local partners and bringing all partners together to design crisis modifier templates and tools streamlined the crisis modifier process. Restricting crisis modifier responses to areas where local partners already have a presence reduced operational and support burdens and strengthened community-NGO relationships.

The SOMJR crisis modifier encouraged local actor disaster preparedness and response. The inclusion of the crisis modifier was designed based on the request of local partners, who wished to prepare for crises that may occur during the project period. Once the crisis modifier mechanism was made available, partners implemented contingency plans for crisis response.

Divergent partnership agreements between consortium members undermined the localization objectives of the SOMJR crisis modifier. International and local partnerships did not all adhere to the partnership parameters laid out in the crisis modifier design. As a result, some partners reported facing undue delays in the approval of crisis modifier responses and receipt of crisis modifier funding.

Local and international partners would benefit from capacity building on localization and crisis modifier best practices and policies. Internal policies and capacities of both international and local partners were not always well-adapted to implement a localized crisis modifier mechanism. One local partner highlighted needs for strengthening of financial and procurement policies to support high-quality rapid humanitarian response. International partners did not seem fully aware of the ways in which a crisis modifier contributes to localization principles and objectives for partnership and funding.

2.2. Key Recommendations

Standardize partnership agreements and crisis modifier procedures between consortium members. To support the localization objectives of the SOMJR crisis modifier, it is recommended that future iterations of the modifier create a standard sub award agreement for INGO and LNGOs in the SOMJR consortium.

Increase crisis modifier funding modality and frequency and improve documentation and quality control. To increase the relevance and impact of the crisis modifier mechanism, it is recommended that future iterations of the crisis modifier increase the funding available for crisis modifier interventions and invest in a pooled fund model that can be 'topped up' by donors.

Consider including crisis modifier trigger mechanisms that are community-based.

In pursuance of improved localization, it is recommended that future iterations of the crisis modifier establish community-early response and warning committees[1] that are integrated into crisis modifier decision making systems, thus enabling deeper engagement with affected communities for crisis modifier responses.

Build the capacity of LNGO and INGO partners to implement SOMJR Crisis Modifier objectives and principles. To enable a more effective, efficient, and risk-mitigated crisis modifier response, it is recommended that future iterations of the crisis modifier strengthen the capacities of INGO and LNGO partner policies, procedures, and understandings, creating, for example, crisis-modifier specific procurement and finance policies. LNGO and INGO partners should receive capacity support on principles of localization and how the design of the crisis modifier contributes to the localization of aid.

Puntland handwashing station. Photo: KAALO

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[1] See SomRep's community warning committee structure.

3. DESK REVIEW

3.1 Crisis Modifiers

Crisis modifiers utilize funding, typically from a project-based or institutionally-hosted contingency fund, to address smaller crises that arise quickly, are geographically limited in scope, are likely to be unaddressed by traditional humanitarian funding mechanisms and threaten the development or humanitarian gains of a given project.[2] Because crisis modifiers are built into larger resilience or humanitarian programing, crisis modifier responses are typically mobilized quicker than traditional humanitarian funding mechanisms. This process is especially efficient when crisis modifier procedures, tools, and systems are designed and agreed upon via peer-to-peer interorganizational collaboration.

An effectively implemented crisis modifier enables agencies to react swiftly to a crisis through rapid response or forecast based early action without disrupting other programmatic investments that attend to the root causes of people's vulnerability to shocks and pressures. In order to mobilize resources quickly, crisis modifier mechanisms are detailed at the design stage of projects with clear parameters, triggers, tools, and budget ceilings. Project partners who have access to crisis modifier funding are therefore encouraged to prepare for crisis and sensitize their teams to identify and operationalize crisis modifier responses quickly, thus contributing to contingency planning and preparedness for response.[3]

Crisis modifiers are largely used to respond to crises that occur rapidly for timely and localized responses. As such, the literature suggests that crisis modifiers have four interlinked advantages over other modalities of DRF and traditional humanitarian responses and development initiatives.[4]

1. Crisis modifiers **preserve the gains earned under resilience, development, or humanitarian projects** by allowing for flexible responses to changing conditions.[5]
2. Crisis modifiers **create the conditions for disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction** by encouraging stakeholders to create contingency plans and procedures to identify and respond to crises as they happen.
3. Crisis modifiers **accelerate humanitarian response.**
4. Crisis modifiers enable partners to **flexibly adapt** to changing circumstances.[6]
5. Crisis modifiers enable **localized humanitarian responses** by equipping local and national actors, including governments, communities, and civil society organizations, with the tools and agency to identify, prioritize, and respond to crises as they happen.

All five advantages presented by the crisis modifier approach are heightened in contexts of protracted, complex, and chronic humanitarian need, where dynamic conditions and cyclical disasters are likely to strike and undermine project outcomes.

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[2] Barnaby Willits-King, Lena Weingärtner, Florence Pichon, and Alexander Spencer. "Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding." Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group, (May 2020).

[3] ECHO. "Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Technical Annex Horn of Africa: Financial, Administrative, and Operational Information." ECHO, (2019): 10.

[4] Advantages are described in greater detail within Barnaby Willits-King, Lena Weingärtner; Florence Pichon; and Alexander Spencer. "Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding." Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group, (May 2020): 37 - 38.

[5] Somalia Resilience Program (SomRep). "SomRep Strategy Phase II 2018 - 2023." Action Against Hunger, ADRA Somalia, CARE International, COOPI, DRC, Oxfam and World Vision, (August 2019): 37.

[6] Dorian LaGuardia and Lydia Poole. "Review: DFID's Internal Risk Facility: Changing the Humanitarian Financing Landscape for Protracted Crises? Final Report." TRANSTEC, (2016): 26.

3.2. Crisis Modifiers in Somalia and Beyond

In Somalia, and in the Horn of Africa more generally, crisis modifiers are particularly salient - as cyclical climate shocks and protracted and erratic conflict exacerbate long-standing humanitarian needs and threaten fragile development and humanitarian gains.

In 2019, the USAID and Swiss Development Cooperation-funded Somalia Resilience Program (SomRep), composed of a consortium of NGOs, tested its crisis modifier tool after the launch of the Drought Impact Response plan to accommodate for poor harvest and climate-driven insecurity.[7] SomRep has adopted the crisis modifier model and has designed the use of its 'Crisis Modifier Pooled Fund' to support an array of post-shock recovery activities, such as Cash for Work infrastructure rehabilitation, Unconditional Cash Transfers, emergency water trucking, Non-Food Item distributions, and interventions that support immediate disease treatment for livestock.[8]

Between 2013 and 2017, the DFID-funded Multi-Year Humanitarian Program in Somalia allocated 24% of its project funds (GBP 36,132,367) to implement its Internal Risk Facility (IRF).[9] The IRF provided emergency funding on the basis of a 15 indicator trigger, that once tripped supported existing DFID UN and INGO partners, including WFP and BRCiS, with emergency funding for a period of six months.

ECHO has also prioritized crisis modifiers as a model for strengthening early response capacity in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.[10] Similar to SomRep, the ECHO model for crisis modifiers in Horn of Africa is tied to a set of specific humanitarian indicators and responses

for a range of pre-approved activities, such as emergency water trucking. The ECHO-funded La Niña Consortium, for example, established a contingency fund of Euro 300,000 for emergency response in Kenya.[11]

Beyond the Horn of Africa, DFID has supported a crisis modifier model via the humanitarian contingency fund, PHASE, within the Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) project.[12] Implemented from 2015 and 2018, the BRACED project crisis modifier model enabled any of the 15 members of the BRACED consortium to apply for up to GBP 250,000 in PHASE crisis modifier funding.

3.2.1 Differences Between Crisis Modifier Models

1. Access Rules

By design crisis modifiers can be triggered quickly by project partners using tools and resources that are designed to be mobilized in accordance to 'access rules'[13] that are distinct between crisis modifier models. In the four examples outlined above, crisis modifier funding is accessed via two access rule frameworks: those with established, predetermined triggers and those without. Both BRACED and the La Niña Consortium did not use triggers, requiring partners to apply for crisis modifiers via review committees.[14]

Conversely, both SomRep and the Multi Year Humanitarian Project employed a complex trigger system for early warning and anticipatory action. In the SomRep design, the Crisis Modifier can be triggered Early Warning Committees and warnings from government and international agencies, such as FSNAU and FEWS NET.[15] Similarly, the Multi Year Humanitarian Program used a 15 indicator trigger

[7] SIDA. "Somalia HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ANALYSIS 2020." SIDA, (December 2020).

[8] Somalia Resilience Program (SomRep). "SomRep Strategy Phase II 2018 - 2023." Action Against Hunger, ADRA Somalia, CARE International, COOPI, DRC, Oxfam and World Vision, (August 2019).

[9] Dorian LaGuardia and Lydia Poole. (2016).

[10] ECHO. "Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Technical Annex Horn of Africa: Financial, Administrative, and Operational Information." ECHO, (2019).

[11] Lung, Felix. "How donors can use crisis modifiers to fund response activities after health shocks: Literature review." Oxford Policy Management, (July 2020): 6 - 10.

[12] Katie Peters and Florence Pichon. "Crisis Modifiers: A solution for a more flexible development-humanitarian system?" BRACED, (November 2017).

[13] Lung, Felix. (July 2020).

[14] *Ibid*: 8.

[15] SomRep. "SomRep Strategy Phase II 2018 - 2023." SomRep, (August 2019): 28 - 29.

that utilized data on food security, displacement, disease outbreak, and trade indicators collected by FSNAU.[16]

2. Funding Arrangements

Crisis modifier funding and approval arrangements tend to fall into two distinct camps. First, funding arrangements for crisis modifier models can be built directly into the budgets of implementing organizations. For instance, phase one of the USAID OFDA-funded Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative Program allowed for up to 10% of NGO partner funding to be reallocated for crisis response.[17]

The second, and the more common crisis modifier funding arrangement, is to structure crisis response funding within a pooled contingency fund that is set aside for emergency response, as the BRACED project, which set aside GBP 1.5 million for crisis response, and the SomRep program, which utilizes a crisis modifier pooled fund that is open for donor investment,[18] do.

3. Response Limitations

Typically, crisis modifiers models limit partner responses to a specific geography, sector, and response window. Some projects, such as SomRep limit crisis modifier responses to specific activities. Still other crisis modifier models, such as the PHASE model in BRACED, allow for any crisis response type,[19] and other responses appear to be operationally limited by the application processes rather than by explicit design requirements.

3.3. Disaster Risk Financing in the Humanitarian Sector

Crisis modifiers exist within a larger field of Disaster Risk Financing (DRF).[20] Broadly defined, DRF instruments operate across a broad spectrum of global disaster risk financing strategies, including global pooled funds, country-based pooled funds, contingency financing strategies, and global anticipation funds with response strategies. According to the World Bank, build resilience through core principles of disaster risk reduction, institutional-strengthening, and cost reduction.[21]

3.4. DRF Mechanisms in Somalia and Beyond

Each DRF instrument has its own particular scope. Modalities of DRF include large insurance schemes financed by multilateral

institutions, such as the World Bank's Global Crisis Risk Platform;[22] country-based pooled funds, such as the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); and global anticipation and response funds, such as the Start Network Fund and UNOCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Even within DRF instruments there are discussions for establishing more layered DRF facilities that increase response time, resource efficiency, and leadership.[23]

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[16] Dorian LaGuardia and Lydia Poole. (2016).

[17] This approach of reallocating development funding was found to have deleterious effects for development outcomes and was abandoned in PLI Phase II. See: USAID Food For Peace (FFP). "Early Response to Drought in Pastoralist Areas: Lessons from the USAID Crisis Modifier in East Africa." USAID FFP, (November, 2015).

[18] Lung, Felix. (July 2020): 6-7.

[19] Katie Peters and Florence Pichon. "Crisis Modifiers: A solution for a more flexible development-humanitarian system?" BRACED, (November 2017).

[20] Montier, Emily; Clare Harris; and Nicola Ranger. "Disaster Risk Financing in Concert." Start Network, (September 2019).

[21] World Bank Group. "Financial Protection Against Natural Disasters: An Operational Framework for Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance." World Bank Group, (2014): 27 - 28.

[22] World Bank Group. "Global Crisis Risk Platform." World Bank Group, (June 2018).

[23] Nicola Ranger and Daniel Clarke. "What role for disaster risk financing and insurance in the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)?" Center for Global Disaster Protection, (May 2019).

3.4.1. Country-based Pooled Funds

Country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) are humanitarian funding mechanisms that are established by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and receive contributions from government and private donors. CBPFs allocate funding to humanitarian actors operating in countries that are affected by crises in order to enable "timely and effective life-saving assistance."[24] Supported largely by bi-lateral contributions, the most common CBPFs are the Common Humanitarian Funds operated by UNOCHA.

Example: Common Humanitarian Funds and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund

The Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) are country-based pooled funds that provide "early and predictable" humanitarian funding to INGOs, LNGOs, and UN Agencies.[25] Funded primarily by bilateral donor contributions, the CHFs arose as a means to mobilize humanitarian resources to address humanitarian needs on a flexible, predictable basis using an inclusive, democratic design that leverages country cluster systems to approve members and allocate resources. CHFs across the world include the Ethiopian Humanitarian Fund, Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, which was established in 2010 to provide "strategic and flexible funding" to INGOs, LNGOs, and UN Agencies responding to humanitarian needs in Somalia.[26]

3.4.2. Global Anticipation and Response Funds

Global Anticipation and Response Funds support humanitarian action in anticipation of crisis and in response to rapid-onset cruises based on predetermined allocation criteria. Typically, Global Anticipation and Response Funds are designed to address a rapid-onset and underfunded emergency that would not otherwise receive support from humanitarian funding instruments. Depending on the design of the mechanism, funds may be pooled from multiple contributors or be supported entirely by a single donor.[27]

Example: Start Network Fund

Through its Crisis Anticipation Window, The Start Network Fund mobilizes resources to respond to underfunded and rapid-onset emergencies across the world. The Start Network Fund Crisis Anticipation Window is an NGO-managed multi-donor pooled fund designed to respond rapidly to and in anticipation of underfunded small to medium crises through an anticipatory mechanism that is designed to mobilize resources in anticipation of or quickly after a crisis.[28] Since 2016, the Start Fund Crisis Anticipation Window has disbursed GBP 6,238,616 to fund responses in 21 separate countries.[29]

3.5 Crisis Modifiers and The Localization of Humanitarian Aid

Elevated by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the subsequent Grand Bargain Agreement, the 'localization agenda' stands as one of the most significant transformative global forces in humanitarian aid and development assistance. Broadly conceived, the localization agenda seeks to decentralize and democratize decision making power and resource allocation away from international and multilateral institutions to local and national governments and local and national non-governmental organizations.

A number of international frameworks have been erected to inform and guide the localization of humanitarian aid and development assistance, such as the UNOCHA-managed Charter for Change,[30] and the NEAR Network Localization Performance Measurement Framework.

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[24] UNOCHA. "About Country-Based Pooled Funds." UNOCHA, (2020): 1.

[25] UNOCHA. "Common Humanitarian Funding Overview." UNOCHA.

[26] UNOCHA. "Somalia Humanitarian Fund Operational Manual." UNOCHA, (February 2020).

[27] Barnaby Willitts-King, Lena Weingärtner, Florence Pichon, and Alexander Spencer. "Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding." Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group, (May 2020).

[28] Start Network and Save the Children. "The Start Fund Handbook." Start Network, (June 2020). https://startprogrammes.app.box.com/s/zsqlezvuv23whai9px2la5nh7y5nevv8.

[29] "Start Fund Crisis Anticipation." *Start Network*. https://startnetwork.org/start-fund/crisis-anticipation-window.

[30] Charter for Change. "Charter for Change Initiative." Humanitarian Aid International (HAI).

Guided by these frameworks, the literature reviewed indicates significant potential for crisis modifier models to contribute to the facilitation of the localization agenda through three key performance measurements: (1) facilitating more genuine and equitable partnerships and less subcontracting, (2) more effective support for strong and sustainable institutional capacities for LNGOs, (3) increasing access to funding mechanisms resources, (2) encouraging stronger partnerships, and (4) greater leadership, presence and influence of LNGOs in humanitarian leadership in coordination mechanisms, and (5) enabling localized people-centered humanitarian response.

3.5.1. A Framework for Localization

The literature posits a theoretical framework for localization that is defined by a multidimensional approach that extends beyond capacity strengthening and funding increases to include key dimensions, such as principled partnership, participation of affected communities, localized coordination mechanisms, visibility and policy.[31] To reflect the complexity pathways towards localization, frameworks for localization, such as the NEAR Network's Localization performance measurement framework,[32] generally highlight four key areas for enabling locally-led humanitarian actions:[33]

First, the literature highlights partnerships. Informed by the 2007 Principles of Partnership established by the Global Humanitarian Platform,[34] improving partnerships for the purposes of the localization agenda pursues more genuine and

equitable partnerships with less subcontracting. Improvements in partnership structures include a shift from project-based partnerships to strategic partnerships, and engagement between partners that persists throughout the project cycle,[35] including collaborative and joint designs, shared decision-making, and assuming roles and responsibilities with complementarity.[36][37]

Second, the literature highlights capacity for local and national actors to respond effectively and efficiently to humanitarian crises with people-centered humanitarian response. Actions include mutual capacity assessments between local and national actors and international actors, comprehensive capacity and organizational strengthening programs (informed by local/national priorities and include long-term development objectives).[38][39]

Third, the literature highlights funding - financial resources with the objective of increasing the access of local and national actors to international and national funding mechanisms. Actions under the area of funding include donors increasing the flow direct funding received by local organizations.[40]

Fourth, the literature highlights coordination, namely that local and national actors have "greater presence, influence and leadership in humanitarian coordination mechanisms"[41] as equal partners. [42]

Finally, the literature highlights the need for participation - for "fuller and more influential

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[31] UNICEF. "Working Paper – A Review of UNICEF's Approach to Localization in Humanitarian Action." UNICEF, (July 2019).

[32] Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR). "Localization Performance Framework." NEAR Network, (April, 2020).

[33] Christina Schmalenbach. "Pathways to Localization: A framework towards locally-led humanitarian response in partnership-based action." Christian Aid, CARE, Tearfund, ActionAid, CAFOD, and Oxfam (October, 2019): 9.

[34] Global Humanitarian Platform. "Principles of Partnership." Global Humanitarian Platform, (July 2007).

[35] NEAR Network. "Localization Performance Framework." Near Network, (April, 2020): 5.

[36] Christina Schmalenbach. (October, 2019): 11.

[37] Key indicators, according to the NEAR Framework, are (1) quality in relationships, (2) shift from project-based to strategic partnerships, and (3) engagement of partners throughout the project cycle.

[38] Christina Schmalenbach. (October 2019): 11 - 12.

[39] Key indicators, according to the NEAR Framework, are (1) performance management, (2) organizational development, (3) quality standards, and (4) recruitment and surge.

[40] Key indicators, according to the NEAR Framework, are (1) quantity of funding, (2) quality of funding, (3) access to direct funding, (3) financial management and risk mitigation, and (4) financial management and risk mitigation.

[41] Christina Schmalenbach. (October 2019): 13.

[42] Key indicators, according to the NEAR Framework, are (1) humanitarian leadership, (2) humanitarian coordination, and (3) collaborative and complementary response.

Hygiene kit distribution. Photo: KAALO

involvement of affected people in what relief is provided."[43] Key indicators, according to the NEAR Framework, are (1) Participation of affected people in humanitarian response, (2) engagement of affected people in humanitarian policy development and standard setting.

3.6. Dutch Relief Alliance Somalia Joint Response Crisis Modifier

3.6.1. Intro to SOMJR

The Somalia Joint Response is a Dutch MFA-funded - through the Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA) - multisectoral, integrated humanitarian project implementing interventions in Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central Somalia. Consisting of four INGOs and six LNGOs, SOMJR focuses on Cash Transfers, Food Security and Livelihoods, Health, Nutrition, Protection, and WASH, and seeks to provide: (1) more accountable humanitarian action, (2) innovation and learning, (3) collaboration for effective responses, (4) more effective support for locally led response. Accountability and localization are the key objectives and drivers of the consortium with significant budget resources being allocated toward these ends.

3.6.2. SOMJR Crisis Modifier Design

During the 2020 he SOMJR Crisis Modifier Pilot was initiated as a collaborative process between INGO and LNGO partners with two objectives: (1) to

allow local NGOs to design and manage quality emergency response programs and (2) to identify strengths and areas for capacity development in relation to emergency response in Somalia. The crisis modifier was introduced upon partners' requests who, unlike their INGO counterparts, did not have access to flexible funding and contingency amounts/ICR in their 2019 budgets to rapidly respond to emergencies. The design of the crisis modifier intended for each of the local partners to receive the funding directly at the start of the SOMJR 2020 project implementation cycle to enable rapid response to onset crises. Thus, with an overall budget of EUR 200,000, each SOMJR local partner received Euro 33,333 in crisis modifier funding.

At the project design stage, all local partners were brought together in Hargeisa to workshop the crisis modifier tools, including the project budget design, the application requirements, and the project reporting templates and systems. In this way, the SOMJR consortium ensured that the crisis modifier pilot was designed through a process of peer-to-peer collaboration.

At the onset of a crisis, SOMJR local partners issued alerts by email to the SOMJR Coordinator (Hosted by Oxfam) and their relevant INGO partner (Oxfam, World Vision or Medair). Crisis modifier responses were expected to be implemented for a maximum of 90 days, and each response had to be completed before 31 December 2020.

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[43] *Ibid.* 11 - 33.

3.6.3. SOMJR Crisis Modifier Projects

1. PARTNER: HORN OF AFRICA VOLUNTARY YOUTH COMMITTEE (HAVOYOCO)

Project: Prevention and Control of Covid-19 through public Hygiene promotion; Support Somaliland Ministry of Health by providing essential disinfectants, spraying pumps and strengthening their awareness raisings as well as implementing public hygiene promotion activities in Hargeisa, Burao, Las-Anod, Tukaraq Wajale and Goroyo-Awl (Borama).
Budget: USD 46,395.50.

2. PARTNER: TAAKULO SOMALI COMMUNITY (TASCO)

Project: a COVID-19 response to support IDPs in Burao, the center of the largest IDP population in Somaliland, with WASH. 300 households reached through NFI distribution (1,800 IDPs).
Budget: $32,000

3. PARTNER: ZAM ZAM

Project: Strengthening Prevention Measures to COVID-19 for IDPs in Deynile, District, Mogadishu. Reduce morbidity, control transmission and prevent mortality, Raise awareness and improve the preparedness of vulnerable groups.
Budget: $36,530

4. PARTNER: MUNAZZAMAT AL-DAWA ISLAMIYYA (DAWA)

Project: Preventing risk of COVID-19 infection spread among IDP and vulnerable host population in Karan district of Mogadishu. Improved Hygiene practices and Health promotion among the vulnerable targeted population in Karan
Budget: $ 36,319.50

5. PARTNER: CANDLELIGHT FOR ENVIRONMENT, EDUCATION AND HEALTH (CANDLELIGHT)

Project: Support to Cyclone affected communities in Salahley District. Improve households' immediate access to food through provision of food items to families affected by the cyclone and support them recover from its impact
Budget: $15,100

Project: COVID 19 awareness and prevention in schools; Conduct school based awareness raising and behavior changes for prevention of COVID-19 amongst learners and teachers; Promote safe learning environment of learners and teachers
Budget: $17,500

6. PARTNER: KAALO

Project: Covid 19 Prevention and Response Project. Reduce risk of COVID 19 Virus to older adults and vulnerable members of the community in Bosaso IDPs and Jariiban; Hygiene promotion, distribution of PPP and Hygiene kits and awareness campaign.
Budget: N/A

Project: Cyclone Gati Response. Support IDP households in Bosaso and Jariiban to respond to and recover from the impacts of Cyclone Gati.
Budget: N/A

4. ANALYSIS OF SOMJR CRISIS MODIFIER PILOT

4.1. Learning Area One: Localization

4.1.1. Partnerships

Within the framework of localization outlined in the desk review, the crisis modifier relationships reflect mixed achievement of relationship quality and engagement. According to KIIs conducted with all LNGOs and two INGO partners, the crisis modifier design was collaborative from the outset, and local partners were engaged in crisis modifier design and review at the launch of the SOMJR 2020 project cycle. As a result, all local partner staff interviewed in the KIIs reported positive understandings and ownership of the partnership that produced the crisis modifier model.

Similarly, all local partners reported that they understood the SOMJR 2020 crisis modifier as a means for empowerment a step away from the more traditional subcontracting model. All local partners reported that the crisis modifier mechanism in the SOMJR 2020 project had improved their agency to define priorities with communities independently of their INGO partners.

Indeed, the flexibility of the SOMJR crisis modifier framework and partnership structure enabled local partners to work more closely with affected communities and local governments, and their INGO partner played only a support role by design. According to the HAVOYOCO Program Manager, the partnership model of the SOMJR 2020 crisis modifier "increased HAVOYOCO's interaction with the community," and "directly responded exactly to the needs on the ground at the right time with the right purpose."

However, inconsistent partnership frameworks between INGO and LNGO partners undermined the relationship quality. Despite a clear and agreed upon procedure for crisis modifier funding, several partners reported that their INGO counterpart applied additional requirements that reduced their independence and slowed their crisis modifier response.

From the KIIs conducted, it was broadly understood by partners - INGO and LNGO - that the ability of local partners to respond quickly and effectively was the objective of the crisis modifier design. Thus, according to the design of the crisis modifier, local partners were intended to have access to the Euro 33,000 within their budget lines from the outset of the SOMJR 2020 project cycle. This was done in order to facilitate fast response times and flexible funding use. However, only three local partners reported that this arrangement actually occurred.

Both World Vision International and Medair held the Euro 33,000 within their own budget, not the partner's, and one local partner reported that an agreement signed between their organization and their INGO partner required that they pre finance activities. This undermined response times and does not reflect well on the principles of partnership and localization sought by the crisis modifier mechanism.

This partner and other partners reported mixed experiences with the crisis modifier mechanism partnership arrangement. One partner reported that they felt the process had been slowed by inconsistent INGO decisions. Namely, the partner reported that while the Oxfam Coordination team was quick to respond and give approval for crisis modifier response, their INGO grant managing partner took undue time in approving crisis modifier funding.

This dynamic is reflected in the crisis modifier responses times reported by local partners. LNGOs whose partnership agreements with their INGO partner reflected the design of the crisis modifier, reported mobilizing resources and responses within days after submitting an application for crisis modifier response. Conversely, LNGOs

whose partnership agreements with their INGO partner did not reflect the intended design of the crisis modifier - specifically, LNGOs who did not have access to the funding directly in their project budgets - reported that the timeline from submitting a proposal to receiving approval to receiving funding and mobilizing a response could take between three to four weeks.

Notably, even with the delays and extra contractual layers, all LNGO partners reported increased ownership and agency in designing and implementing a humanitarian intervention through the crisis modifier mechanism. Moreover, the inconsistent partnership frameworks between INGOs is perhaps understandable, as the crisis modifier model is still a relatively new concept for most organizations, and many do not have the institutional familiarity and background with the logic and principles of localization underpinning the crisis modifier mechanism to comfortably reflect the approach within their partnership frameworks. Future iterations of the crisis modifier model within and beyond the SOMJR would do well to facilitate improved buy-in and partnership policies from INGO stakeholders as well as to also promote LNGO leverage to turn down partnership agreements that do not pursue the localization agenda.

4.1.2. Capacity

Based on the KIIs conducted with INGO and LNGO partners, the crisis modifier played an important capacity development role for local partners who are not typically equipped with the agency to independently design and implement a rapid humanitarian response. According to the interviewed LNGO and INGO staff, the crisis modifier approach supported local partners to play a role in designing and implementing humanitarian interventions that is typically reserved for INGOs or donors. As the head of programs for local partner Candlelight put it "[the program development process] was very inclusive, as much as there were defined sectors, it was up to us."

However, the KIIs also highlighted a need for targeted capacity development for local and international partners to better facilitate crisis modifier responses. One SOMJR local partner indicated that their organization would benefit from improved capacity support on the

procurement and finance policies required to mobilize resources quickly while maintaining high level procurement and finance risk mitigation strategies. More generally, the KIIs highlighted that most partners - INGO and LNGO alike - found that their internal policies and procedures were forced to adapt to the crisis modifier design.

Still, according to KIIs, the quality of crisis modifier responses was not diminished from national standards of humanitarian response. Local partners emphasized that the strength of the crisis modifier approach was that it leveraged existing systems and in-kind contributions that were easily availed to respond to needs in areas where the partner already worked.

4.1.3. Funding

The SOMJR Crisis Modifier Pilot provided local partners with a new and innovative funding mechanism, and increased funding availability to local actors considerably as part of the overall project design. Local partners were largely permitted to use all project funds as they deemed appropriate and all local partners were able to use project funds to cover the operational costs associated with crisis modifier response implementation.

Additionally, because the crisis modifier was limited to areas within which the partner already operated, but was not limited to SOMJR project locations, local partners implemented crisis modifier responses efficiently and effectively supporting crisis-affected communities with minimal operational costs. For example, local partner Candlelight made use of the project funding to implement two separate crisis modifier responses, one to support schools in SOMJR project locations with COVID-19 WASH and health response, and another to respond quickly to support communities affected by flash flooding with rapid humanitarian support.

The Candlelight crisis modifier responses are one of several examples where local partners made effective and efficient use of crisis modifier funding to support crisis-affected communities. Despite the small sum of available funding - Euro 33,000 - SOMJR local partners capitalized on the flexibility of the crisis modifier design to adapt to dynamic needs and the responses of other organizations.

KAALO, for instance, first deployed crisis modifier funding to support IDPs in Bosaso to prepare for and respond to the threats presented by COVID-19. Interviews with key staff from KAALO highlighted that the organization had responded so rapidly with crisis modifier funding that their operations were among the first COVID-19 related support that IDPs received. That rapid response and funding dynamism enabled KAALO to evaluate the operations of other humanitarian actors as various responses were rolled out in IDP camps in Bosaso.

Equipped with this perspective and without the requirements for budget and project realignment that accompany traditional humanitarian programming, KAALO was able to redirect funding to other neglected needs brought to them by their communities. KAALO decided to preserve a percentage of its crisis modifier funding once its staff confirmed that COVID-19 responses by other organizations were scaling up. By the end of November, the shrewdness of this decision came into full clarity, as KAALO was ready to respond to Cyclone Gati, the strongest storm to ever reach Somalia, by flexibly and rapidly mobilizing resources to meet the needs of IDPs in Bosaso.

However, several organizations reported that they did not receive crisis modifier funding directly. KIIs conducted with all six local partners, indicated that three partners - Zamzam, Dawa, and TASCO - all experienced delays in funding and that none of them were budget holders of crisis modifier funds. Instead, their INGO partners held onto the crisis modifier funding and allocated it to them on the basis of partnership frameworks that did not reflect the design of the crisis modifier mechanism. In the cases of Zamzam and Dawa, each organization received crisis modifier budgets through three disbursements. In the case of TASCO, their INGO partner required that TASCO prefinance the entirety of the crisis modifier response. These funding arrangements ensured that while each organization had access to new and innovative funding mechanisms, the potential benefits for the localization of aid presented by the crisis modifier were undermined.

4.1.4. Coordination

Findings from the KIIs highlighted that the crisis modifier ensured a collaborative and complementary response in line with the NEAR Localization Framework. The crisis modifier responses did well to leverage the complementarity between INGOs and LNGOs. Where LNGOs felt they lacked organizational capacity, INGOs often played a support role. This was most clearly described by local partners who leaned on the superior Monitoring and Evaluation capacities of their INGO counterparts to monitor the implementation of crisis modifier responses.

Additionally, the crisis modifier of SOMJR 2020 supported LNGO partners to increase their coordination and collaboration with relevant line ministries. Five of the six interviewed local partners highlighted that when COVID-19 struck Somalia, they were in close contact with the relevant public health ministries of Somalia and Somaliland to prioritize rapid COVID-19 Reponses.

4.1.5. Participation

Crisis modifier responses, according to KIIs, involved affected communities more closely in humanitarian responses than typical humanitarian interventions. Each local partner in the SOMJR project has been operating in the crisis modifier project areas for years, some for decades. As such, the local partners are deeply embedded in the communities that they operate within, and when communities were in need of support to respond to COVID-19, flash flooding, or Cyclone Gati, community leaders reached out to SOMJR local partners for assistance.

With typical humanitarian funding, local partners would not have been able to quickly respond to the needs reported by affected communities. However, the crisis modifier flexibility enabled the SOMJR local partners to work closely with affected communities to design, implement and monitor crisis modifier responses. Local partners conducted rapid assessments through community-based mechanisms, including village committees, camp management committees, health promotion networks, and traditional leadership structures, and collaborated with local authorities to ensure alignment and coordination with government priorities. Multiple local partners interviewed in KIIs reported that the crisis modifier mechanism actually improved their relationship with vulnerable communities, as their ability to respond rapidly and dynamically to the priorities of

affected communities reinforced their legitimacy as reliable community-oriented organizations.

4.2. Learning Area Two: Core Humanitarian Standards

The section of the study aims to understand how SOMJR crisis modifier responses were implemented in-line with the Core Humanitarian Standards through the assessment of the intervention's compliance with essential elements of principled and accountable humanitarian action. Although adherence to specific commitments were not measured, Key Actions and Organizational Responsibilities were assessed for both local and INGOs to adherence delivery of high-quality, accountable humanitarian assistance.

4.2.1. Communities and people affected by the crisis receive assistance appropriate to their needs.

Quality Criterion - Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant. IND - *The assistance and protection provided correspond with assessed risks, vulnerabilities and needs.*

Despite limitations from COVID-19, each organization utilized its positioning within the community to conduct rapid needs assessments. The Project narrative, budget sheets and Final report are simplistic by design and closely position the structure on some aspects of the CHS's principled, accountable and high-quality humanitarian action. The main structure focuses on assessment and analysis, vulnerability focus and data disaggregation, existing capacity and presence, coordination, financial management and MEAL. Though sufficient to capture the appropriateness and relevance of interventions, there are noted gaps amongst partners in adherence to the structure, as only two partners had submitted a final narrative report. This placed limitations on this paper's determination on the efficacy of these interventions.

Key Actions - *Adapt programs to changing needs, capacities and context.* The modifier had built-in flexibility that allowed local partners sufficient scope to redesign interventions according to the needs of the affected communities. Partners noted the limited funding scale of the crisis

modifier, however, the flexibility of the modifier was demonstrated by the work of Candlelight and KAALO, who used funding to respond to two separated crises - Cyclone Gati and flash flooding.

4.2.2. Communities and people affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.

Quality criterion: *Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.*

Key Actions - *Support self-help initiatives and community preparedness actions.* All crisis modifier projects built on local capacities and worked towards improving the resilience of communities and people affected by crisis. KIIS indicated high organizational complementarity with local communities and local authority's capacity to respond to crisis. Specific components include, selection and training of hygiene promoters from the affected communities, working with local health workers to make door to door visits to raise awareness and capacity strengthening of local authorities. Moreover, contributions to the local, regional and national COVID-19 response plans were mentioned as critical to include the target community in such plans, where relevant agencies were reliant on these interventions to build community resilience to effects of the pandemic. ZAMZAM based their activities in the Dayniile IDP camp through coordination with local/national authority. TASCO also stressed the role of their intervention in securing vital assistance to target the community in the Burao IDP camp, which were very vulnerable both the pandemic and exclusion from future humanitarian response to this crisis.

4.2.3. Communities and people affected by the crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.

Quality criterion: Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary. IND *Organizations minimize gaps and overlaps identified by affected communities and partners through coordinated action; Responding organizations – including local organizations – share relevant information*

through formal and informal coordination mechanisms; Organizations coordinate needs assessments, delivery of humanitarian aid and monitoring of aid implementation.

Key Actions - All local partners indicated adequate participation and representation in coordination mechanisms and with good understanding of organizational mandates and mutual roles and responsibilities. Local partners showed clear commitment to coordination and collaboration with others, including national and local authorities, without compromising humanitarian principles. Local partners attended relevant cluster meetings, National Response Committees, and were in direct connection with affected communities. In terms of the latter, some local partners had ongoing activities and/or community assets within the target communities, both funded through the SOMJR project or third party donors.

However, several KIIs indicated unclear and inconsistent partnership agreements that clouded each partner's mandate and reduced independence. One partner emphasized that their partnership agreement limited their ability to respond quickly and required that they pre-finance crisis modifier activities. Another emphasized the comparatively different support roles of the Coordination team (Oxfam) as positive and inclusive and the INGO partner as negative and burdensome.

4.2.4. Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them.

Quality criterion: Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation and feedback. IND *Communities and people affected by crisis are satisfied with the opportunities they have to influence the response.*

Review of the crisis modifier project narratives indicate that initial feedback was sought during assessments and post distribution monitoring by LNGO/INGO staff. Due to their community-based nature local partners stated that informal feedback was received regularly. ZAMZAM for instance, were consistently engaged with community leaders and were able to engage with communities and share this information with authorities at the outset of crisis. Other interviewees emphasized community-ties as their primary resource for planning and implementing interventions. Notably, the learning potential presented by this beneficiary feedback was undermined by poor documentation.

4.2.5. Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.

Quality criterion: Complaints are welcomed and addressed. IND *Communities and people affected by crisis, including vulnerable and marginalized groups, are aware of complaints mechanisms established for their use.* IND - staff and the communities they serve have the opportunity to report complaints to indicate the impact and appropriateness of an intervention, potential risks and vulnerabilities, and the degree to which people are satisfied with the services provided.

The study found limited formal complaint handling or feedback mechanisms. The KIIs confirmed that feedback mechanisms were limited, however, interventions in main SOMJR project locations leveraged the feedback mechanisms of the larger project. Due to the scale of the response and allocation of resources, formal documentation of complaints and feedback from the target community was not a contingent success criterion. The crisis modifier pilot could capture this data within the larger SOMJR MEAL strategy, however, a viable complaint handling and feedback mechanism should be built into crisis modifier responses to capture and maximize learning. This is vital to both CHS quality criterion and to enable the localization of project improvements.

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ANNEX II: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

Find Attached.

DUTCH RELIEF ALLIANCE

Somalia Joint Response (SOMJR) partners